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UPDATE ON THE RATIFICATION DEBATES 
WHAT PROSPECTS FOR THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
TREATY? 
RESULTS OF AN EPIN SURVEY OF NATIONAL EXPERTS 
Introduction 
The ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty has taken some unexpected turns, since the 
publication of our initial report.1 The situation has changed especially dramatically in France: 
within only 10 days the ‘yes’ camp slid from a previously stable figure of around 60% to below 
50%. Our report had concluded that “if the reasons for a particular European compromise are 
not made transparent to the citizens, issues can be used in a divisive way at the national level”. 
It therefore called for a stronger European dimension in the national debates and expressed the 
hope that politicians and the media would play their role in stressing the common European 
significance of the European Constitution. 
While the developments in France prove quite strikingly the problems that a lack of a European 
dimension can cause, they have also raised awareness among political leaders and the media: 
debate about the ratification as a European issue has received a boost, because the prospect of a 
French ‘no’ brought home to national and European level opinion-formers that, whatever the 
reasons for a possible ‘no’ vote may be, its consequences would be felt across the whole of the 
European Union. This realisation is not yet tantamount to a genuinely European debate on the 
issue(s) at stake, but it is an important reminder of the difficulties of ratifying a European Treaty 
by means of 25 different national procedures. 
Despite the media interest currently focusing very much on France, this update report once more 
intends to give an overview of the state of affairs in all member states. At the time of writing, 
seven countries have completed the ratification procedures (EL, ES, HU, IT, LT, SL and SK) 
and in three others one chamber of parliament has already ratified the Treaty (BE, AT and DE) 
(Table 1). The successful referendum in Spain has shown that popular support can be won, even 
though mobilisation and consequently the turnout were low.  
Table 1. Referenda and parliamentary ratification 
Referendum Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain,* United Kingdom 
Parliamentary 
Ratification only 
Austria,** Belgium,** Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Germany,** Greece,* 
Hungary,* Italy,* Latvia, Lithuania,* Malta, Slovenia,* Slovakia,* Sweden 
*Already ratified; **one chamber has already ratified. 
Owing to the developments since the initial report, it is obvious that a re-assessment concerning 
the probability of ratification has to be made. In France and the Netherlands (initially rated 
‘rather likely’) where the referenda will take place in the immediate future, the latest opinion 
polls suggest a tie between the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ sides, so a clear prediction at this point in time 
seems impossible. The outcome in the Netherlands – a traditionally pro-EU country – is 
especially difficult to forecast, because the Dutch decision will also be affected by the French 
vote three days earlier, which is already too close to call. Neither country has a tradition of 
                                                 
1 See Kurpas et al. (2005). 
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deep-rooted Euroscepticism among large parts of the population. That means that many who say 
now that they intend to vote ‘no’ according to the polls might still change their mind in the 
coming weeks. Also, in both countries a relatively high percentage of the population do not yet 
know how they are going to vote. This should be an incentive for an intensive campaign, as it 
can actually make a difference (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Probability of ratification, by country 
Status Country 
Already ratified  Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Slovakia, Spain 
Highly likely Austria,* Belgium,** Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Germany,* Greece, Italy, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Sweden 
Rather likely Denmark, Ireland,  
Unsure Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands, Poland 
Rather unlikely  United Kingdom 
*Lower house already ratified; ** senate already ratified. 
Table 2 is of course only a snapshot, because the dynamics of the process are very difficult to 
predict and a ‘no’ in one member state would affect the probability of ratification in all the other 
referenda that are to follow. Indeed, different scenarios in the case of a French ‘no’ are already 
being discussed, but there seems to be an emerging consensus that the ratification process would 
continue. Only the British government has signalled that a French ‘no’ might make a 
referendum in the UK obsolete.  
The emerging discussion among European and national elites about what would happen if 
France voted ‘no’ raises some interesting questions for the EU as a whole as well as for the 
democratic legitimacy of its current Treaty framework and for the future of the Constitution. 
While it is politically clear that European integration could not continue without France, both 
EU and national politicians were quick to point out that it would be problematic to stop the 
ratification process just because one country votes ‘no’. This would mean that the fate of the 
entire European Union would de facto be hostage to the vote and the will of the countries that 
have already ratified the Treaty would be invalidated.  
In the meantime, theoretically possible – yet not very attractive – alternative solutions for a 
possible ratification crisis are already being debated in the media: abandoning the Treaty 
altogether, renegotiating it, adopting parts of it or even asking the French (or other nations in the 
same situation) to ‘re-consider’ the same text. A difficult problem from a tactical point of view 
is the impact that any premature discussion about a ‘plan B’ might have on voters in France and 
elsewhere. The developments over the coming weeks and months could, however, force 
decision-makers to find pragmatic solutions sooner rather than later.  
This update of our earlier survey of the EPIN network experts in the 25 member countries, 
shown in the following overview in Table 3, provides a snapshot of the ratification processes in 
the different national contexts at a crucial point in time, just before the vote in France on 29 
May. It now remains to be seen whether the much-needed dynamics originating from the 
concrete threat of a rejection can be maintained and used to finally bring a common European 
dimension to the fore – whatever the result in France. 
The data for most member states has been supplemented and approved by the national experts 
from the EPIN member institutes that are taking part in the project (see annex). Important parts 
of the sections on Sweden, the Netherlands, France, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, 
Greece, Slovenia and Spain were drawn from written reports from these experts, which are 
listed in the references. 
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Overview of the ratification procedures in the member states 
Table 3. Ratification procedures by country 
 Process & timing Comments 
AT Parliamentary ratification 
 
Lower house 
(Nationalrat) ratified on 
11 May 2005 
- The Nationalrat ratified the Treaty with 182 ‘yes’ votes and 1 ‘no’ vote from the 
FPÖ 
- Simple majority of lower & upper house needed, a 2/3 majority if the Constitution 
is changed (likely to be obtained) 
- Legally binding referendum (Volksabstimmung) to be initiated by the Congress 
(Nationalrat), if the object of referendum changes the Austrian Constitution (BZÖ-
leader Joerg Haider has stated he will appeal to the Court) 
BE Parliamentary ratification 
 
Senate ratified on 
28 April 2005 
- Senate approved with 54 ‘yes’ votes and 9 ‘no’ votes with 1 abstention 
- Lower house will ratify before end of May (ratification likely) 
- Conseil d’Etat has given a negative opinion (29 Nov. 2004) on a possible 
consultative referendum without changing the Belgian Constitution 
- There is a parliamentary majority against referendum, although Prime Minister 
Guy Verhofstadt is in favour 
- Seven parliamentary bodies need to consider the text 
CY Parliamentary 
ratification, 
date still unknown 
- Binding popular votes not foreseen in the Cypriot Constitution 
- First debate in the EU affairs committee of the House of Representatives took place 
in February  
- Parliamentary ratification debate expected in May  
CZ Possible referendum 
June 2006 
- There is no constitutional obligation for referendum, but there is strong political 
support by major parliamentary parties in favour 
- Parliamentary ratification would need a 3/5 approval in both houses (unlikely to be 
obtained) 
- Binding referendum requires a constitutional act, as there is not yet a general 
framework regulating nationwide referendum 
- Likely that no minimum turnout and no additional requirement to refer the Treaty 
to parliament for ratification will be set (as with the accession referendum) 
- Most likely that the referendum will be held together with general elections  
DE Parliamentary ratification 
Lower house (Bundestag) 
approved on 12 May 
2005 
- The Bundestag ratified the Treaty with a 95% majority (569 ‘yes’ votes against 23 
‘no’ votes and 2 abstentions 
- Upper house (Bundesrat) set to ratify on 27 May (likely) 
- Parliamentary ratification by a 2/3 majority in both houses needed 
- Appeal to Constitutional Court already announced by one MP (if the Court accepts, 
German President Horst Köhler has already stated that he will wait to sign the 
ratification act after the Court has ruled) 
- German federal Constitution does not foresee a referendum 
DK Referendum 
27 September 2005  
- In the absence of a 5/6 majority in parliament, the Danish Constitution requires a 
binding referendum when national sovereignty is transferred  
- Referendum already announced by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen on 1 
January 2004 
- Referendum will not be combined with a referendum on the existing Danish ‘opt-
outs’ (on the euro, defence and JHA matters) 
ES Referendum 
20 February 2005 
 
Parliament voted on 
28 April 2005 
- Optional/non-binding referendum called by the government, to be followed by 
parliamentary ratification with absolute majority  
- Referendum question: “Do you approve of the Treaty by which a Constitution for 
Europe is established?” 
- Result of referendum: 76.73% in favour, 17.24% against, 6.03% no answer  
- Turnout: 42.32%; no minimum turnout requirement 
- Government had to be strictly ‘neutral’ during referendum 
- Spanish parliament ratified on 28 April by 331 votes in favour, 19 against 
EE Parliamentary ratification 
first half of 2005 
- Government and major parties are for parliamentary ratification 
- Simple majority needed (likely to be obtained) 
EL Parliamentary ratification 
19 April 2005 
- Parliament voted for ratification by 268 votes over 17 against 
- Ratification needed a 3/5 majority in parliament  
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FI Parliamentary ratification 
early 2006 
- A 2/3 majority is needed for parliamentary ratification (likely to be obtained) 
- Ratification bill anticipated September 2005 
- Parliamentary approval early spring 2006 
- Constitution only foresees the possibility of a consultative referendum  
- Stable centre-left government is in favour of parliamentary ratification; Prime 
Minister Matti Vahanen ruled out referendum; Conservatives and Greens in favour 
FR Referendum  
29 May 2005 
- President has the power to call a referendum 
- Conseil Constitutionnel stated that ratification of the EU Constitution makes a 
change of the French Constitution necessary 
- Draft law on constitutional changes approved by both chambers (convened as a 
Congrès) on 1 March 2005 (a 3/5 majority was needed) 
HU Parliamentary ratification 
Ratified 20 Dec. 2004 
- Parliament voted in favour of ratification with 322 votes for, 12 against and 8 
abstentions (a 2/3 majority was needed) 
IE Referendum 
late 2005 or early 2006 
- Obligatory, binding referendum 
- Government to publish a Constitutional Amendment Bill that must be approved by 
parliament and then put to the people for referendum 
- No minimum turnout is required for referendum 
IT Parliamentary ratification 
Lower house voted on  
25 January 
Upper house voted on  
6 April 
- Lower house voted in favour with 436 ‘yes’ votes, 28 ‘no’ votes and 5 abstentions 
- Senate voted in favour with 217 ‘yes’ votes and 16 ‘no’ votes 
- A simple majority was required in both houses 
- The Italian Constitution does not foresee referenda on international treaties 
- Only Lega Nord and the Greens were for constitutional reform to hold a 
referendum 
LV Parliamentary ratification 
May-June 2005 
- A simple majority is needed (likely to be obtained) 
- If 50% of parliamentarians are in favour, a referendum could be called, but there is 
a strong majority against referendum 
LT Parliamentary ratification 
Ratified 11 Nov. 2004 
- For parliamentary ratification, a simple majority was needed 
- (Seimas) ratified with 84 ‘yes’ votes, 4 ‘no’ votes and 3 abstentions 
LU Parliament vote + 
consultative 
referendum 
10 July 2005 
- First parliamentary vote in mid-June 
- Participation in a referendum is compulsory (as with elections) 
- Second parliamentary vote after the referendum 
- Parliamentary ratification needs a 2/3 majority 
MT Parliamentary ratification 
expected mid-July 2005 
- Parliamentary ratification requires a simple majority (likely to be obtained) 
NL Referendum 
1 June 2005 
- Non-obligatory, consultative referendum based on a parliamentary initiative 
- A special committee (with members from the social advisory and elections council 
for example) will determine the date, allocation of resources and formulation of 
question 
- Parliament will still have to ratify, but several parties have already indicated they 
will respect the referendum outcome 
PL Referendum 
probably either 
25 September 2005 
or 9 October 2005 
- Referendum non-obligatory, but binding 
- Likely to be held together with presidential and parliamentary elections 
- A 50% turnout is needed in order to be valid 
- Parliamentary ratification would need a 2/3 majority (if the referendum is not valid, 
and it is unlikely to be obtained in the current political situation) 
PT Referendum 
probably  
9 October 2005 
- Non-obligatory referendum 
- A referendum is supposed to be held together with local elections but this requires 
a constitutional amendment 
- Parliamentary ratification would require a simple majority  
SK Parliamentary ratification 
11 May 2005 
- Parliament voted by 116 votes in favour of ratification votes over 34 against 
- A 3/5 majority was needed 
SL Parliamentary ratification 
Ratified 
1 February 2005 
- There were 79 ‘yes’ votes, 4 ‘no’ votes and 7 abstentions 
- Government was against referendum, although the Slovenian Constitution would 
have allowed it to call for one 
SE Parliamentary ratification 
probably  
December 2005 
- Parliamentary ratification needs a 75% majority (likely to be obtained) 
- Prime Minister Göran Persson and four pro-Constitution opposition leaders are 
against a referendum 
- Ratification bill to be presented to parliament on 27 September 
UK Referendum 
probably spring 2006 
- Prime Minister Tony Blair called a referendum in April 2004  
- Referendum likely after the UK’s EU Presidency (Jul-Dec. 2005) in spring 2006 
- Wording of the referendum bill: “Should the United Kingdom approve the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for the European Union?” 
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PART I: Countries Holding Referenda 
Czech Republic 
There is ongoing controversy between the government and the opposition about the legal 
framework for a referendum. Since constitutional change is necessary to allow for a referendum 
on the EU Constitutional Treaty, failure to agree would result in a switch to the parliamentary 
mode of ratification. The recent government crisis has exacerbated this problem and also 
increased the uncertainty in the process.  
The debate on the substance of the Constitutional Treaty has started mainly among the expert 
public, but media attention is now also on the rise. Most of the debate in the Czech Republic has 
so far been about the question of whether to hold a referendum or not. There are careful 
attempts in the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the main opposition party, to take a more 
positive stance on the Constitution, but President Václav Klaus has come out forcefully against 
the Constitution (publishing an article on 10 points against the Constitution both in the Czech 
Republic and in the international media in February). The publication of an anti-Constitutional 
Treaty pamphlet by Mr Klaus’s own think-tank, the Centre for Economics and Politics in April 
(to which he supplied an introduction), prompted an angry exchange between Mr Klaus and 
some members of the European Parliament who defended the Constitution. Generally the tone 
of the debate seems to be rising, not least because of Mr Klaus’s outspoken views against it, 
which makes him the only head of state or government in the Union of 25 to oppose the Treaty. 
Recently, some of the media have started to take an ironic attitude towards Mr Klaus. It seems 
that his anti-Constitutional stance with nationalist overtones is not working too well for his 
popularity. 
In any case, the overall good economic performance of the Czech Republic after EU accession 
(4% economic growth in 2004, further inflow of FDI and structural funds) seems to act as a 
positive element in the debate. Moreover, the EU is increasingly perceived as an important 
guarantee of security (according to an MF Dnes survey on 11 April 68%, of Czechs view the 
EU role positively in this sense), and as a stabilising factor in the recent government crisis. 
On the other hand, the weakness of the government plays against the Constitution, with most of 
the government politicians (who are in favour of the Treaty) perceived as unreliable. Also, some 
statements by French President Jacques Chirac in the context of the debate on the proposed EU 
directive on the liberalisation of service provision in the EU were received by some as an attack 
on the new member states, owing to the implied parallels between liberalism and communism. 
A further problem for the Constitution stems from the role of the larger member states in 
debates such as those about the reform of the stability pact, the Services Directive or foreign 
policy, where they are seen as trying to bully the smaller member states. 
Nevertheless, the latest available opinion polls (a survey conducted by the CVVM agency, 
published on 15 March 2005) show that a majority (56%) of the electorate is in favour of the 
Constitution, with 21% against and 23% undecided – against a background of an expected 
turnout of around 60%. Yet, as in other countries, the level of knowledge (based on the same 
CVVM survey) is also still very low: only 4% of the respondents claimed to be very well or 
well informed and 57% saw themselves as not informed at all. 
The political parties are of course key factors in how this debate is going to evolve in the 
coming months. The main government parties – the Czech Social Democrat Party (CSSD) and 
the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) – are in favour, but as mentioned earlier, owing to the 
government crisis they did not treat the issue as a priority and do very little to initiate the 
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campaign/public debate. The situation is somewhat confused by the position of the US-DEU 
(Freedom Union, a liberal coalition partner), which has not articulated its position clearly. 
On the opposition side, the attitude of the ODS is changing and a growing discrepancy appears 
between local/regional ODS leaders and ODS representatives in the Senate on one hand 
(tending to take a rather positive stance on the Constitution), and the ODS deputies in the Lower 
Chamber and party leaders who follow President Klaus on the other. If the Treaty was to be 
submitted to a parliamentary vote, the ODS would probably be split. The Communist party is 
also against the Constitution but has not been too prominent on the issue so far.  
As elsewhere, the debate in the Czech Republic focuses on domestic issues and players. Since 
most countries in the region have already ratified (Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia) or will 
ratify the Treaty very soon by parliamentary vote only (Germany and Austria), no great 
influence from them is to be expected. Only the debate in Poland (which will vote in 
September) could have an impact, but this will come up (if at all) just before the vote. Of course 
the current situation in France is an issue, which may be another reason for a rather cautious 
approach by the Czech government and administration, and the UK is increasingly in focus 
(also in the media) as the country most likely to vote against the Constitutional Treaty.  
Denmark 
In November 2004, government and opposition parties signed a national agreement aimed at 
securing the broadest possible support for the EU Constitutional Treaty. In light of previous 
referenda in Denmark, this is seen as crucial to ratification.  
But the agreement (Denmark in the enlarged European Union) goes beyond ratification of the 
Treaty, outlining “a new, proactive Danish European Policy” and defining the priorities of 
Danish European policy for the coming years: “more openness and democracy in the EU, a 
strengthening of European competitiveness, an economically, socially and environmentally 
sustainable development, a greater global responsibility of the EU”, etc. 
The downside of this is that each of the five contracting parties is entitled to block any future 
extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council on specific issues. Since the 
passage to QMV in any given area has to be agreed upon by unanimity, the Danish agreement 
could in principle have far-reaching consequences for the entire Union: a contracting party – no 
matter how small and be it or not a member of the government coalition – gains with this 
political agreement a right of veto on EU developments, even if these were to be supported by 
all 25 governments in the EU. 
Concerning the issues that play a role in the debate, the most successful arguments put forward 
by the ‘no’ side are likely to be linked to the issue of national sovereignty. According to 
opponents of the Treaty, sovereignty would be weakened by the kind of European superstate 
that the Constitutional Treaty would allegedly create. The ‘no’ arguments are also likely to 
make a link to the question of the Danish welfare system, depicted as under threat by the ultra-
liberal Constitution. Finally, the accession of Turkey is also likely to feature in the campaign. 
The Eurobarometer (2005) survey gives a mixed picture concerning Denmark, with a level of 
support for the Constitutional Treaty that, at 44%, is well below the EU average. Yet, the 
number of people who declared themselves in favour of the Constitutional Treaty is almost 
double those who declared they are opposed to it (26%). This result, in a traditionally 
Eurosceptic country such as Denmark, can be regarded as encouraging. 
The survey also shows that the rate of participation in the referendum will be high by European 
standards, with 68% of respondents stating that they are sure of going to the ballot box, as 
opposed to only 6% of them who are certain they will not vote. This rate is, however, rather low 
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if compared with the turnouts at previous referenda on EU issues, which were often above 80% 
and at the lowest 75% (for the vote on the Single European Act, back in 1986).  
France 
France will hold a binding referendum on 29 May 2005 and is currently the focus of interest. 
Between the beginning and the middle of March there was a dramatic drop from a stable 60% in 
favour of the Constitution down to only 48%. After 23 consecutive polls confirming a majority 
for the ‘no’ side of the debate, there seems to be a slight recovery (52% would vote ‘yes’) 
suggested by the latest polls since the beginning of May. The official line of both major parties, 
the centre-right UMP and the centre-left Socialist Party (PS), is in favour of the Constitution 
(like the centre French Democratic Union [UDF] and the Greens). Yet there are a number of 
very prominent dissenters within both the UMP and the PS. In an internal referendum of the PS 
in December 2004, the ‘yes’ side won clearly with 59%, but those opposed to the Constitution 
(especially Jean-Luc Mélanchon and Henri Emmanuelli) have not remained silent since then 
and continue to campaign against it. The same is true for dissenters within the UMP (e.g. the 
Mouvement Debout la Republique of Nicolas Dupont-Aignan). The French Communist Party 
(the PCF, with 3.8% of seats) and several other small far-left parties as well as the extreme-right 
National Front (with no seats in parliament, but 11.3% of the vote in the last national elections) 
are also against the Constitution. 
The debate involves large parts of the population and texts of the Constitutional Treaty have 
even become best-sellers in France. Nevertheless, many of the subjects that are publicly debated 
actually have little or nothing to do with the content of the Constitution. Often arguments reflect 
the general discontent of the people with national social reforms and the performance of the 
UMP government.  
There is also a widespread conviction in France (especially on the political left) that the 
Constitution is too ‘neo-liberal’ and that it does not provide enough provision for further 
integration in the field of social policy. On 3 February the 116 members of the Comité 
confédéral national of the main trade union CGT voted (contrary to the recommendation of its 
own leader Bernard Thibault) against the Constitution. The debate then became further confused 
with the issue of the directive on the liberalisation of services (the so-called ‘Bolkestein-
directive’). In France there is a cross-party consensus that the Services Directive in its present 
form is harmful for the French economy and that it would lead to ‘social dumping’. At the 
spring Council meeting of the EU heads of state and government on 22 March 2005, President 
Chirac (with the support of several other leaders) demanded a redraft of the Directive. This was 
perceived as a victory in large parts of the French media, but apparently did not cool the debate 
about the social dimension of the Constitution. Another critical issue in the economic context is 
the debate about the relocation of jobs to the new member states and the fact that the rules of the 
stability pact (seen as strangling political initiatives for more growth and better social 
provisions) are embedded in the text of the Constitution. 
Centre-right parties and the extreme-right National Front have also linked the Constitution to 
the EU membership prospects of Turkey (which is very unpopular in France). The argument is 
made that the new double-majority voting system will grant more voting weight to Turkey than 
to France. Pro-Constitution politicians from the UDF and the UMP raised Turkey’s prospective 
EU membership often at the beginning of the campaign, which ultimately proved to be 
detrimental. This particular issue seems, however, to have lost some of its importance in the 
debate lately.  
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A more general point for critique is the difficult mechanism for the revision of the Constitution, 
which means that even the provisions of part III on EU policies are subject to the full 
requirements of a Treaty change followed by national ratification. 
There are, of course, also subjects that have a rather positive influence on public opinion, like 
the increased democracy and efficiency of the EU or the Charter of Fundamental Rights. But 
other potentially positive issues such as the EU foreign minister, the EU’s strengthened role on 
an international stage or defence policy do not feature very prominently in the public discourse 
and if so, some souverainistes like Pierre Chevènement or Philippe de Villiers tend to denounce 
that NATO is explicitly mentioned in the constitutional text. 
Concerning cross-national references, a great many actors from other member states are helping 
in particular with the campaign for a ‘yes’. For example, the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis 
Rodriguez Zapatero and the president of Portugal addressed the Assemblée Nationale on 1 
March and on 26 April and the entire German government came to Paris for a joint cabinet 
meeting with their French counterparts in support of the Constitution. The European Socialists 
also adopted a declaration calling on all socialists to lead a campaign in France in order to help 
the French PS. A great number of articles have already been published in the French media by 
other European actors.  
The vast majority of the ‘no’ campaigners on the other hand do not pursue such a transnational 
strategy. Lately there have been some limited efforts from the pro-European ‘no’ side to invite 
critics of the Constitution from other countries in an attempt to show that there would be a 
potential for renegotiation of the Treaty. Many ‘no’ campaigners, however, have repeatedly 
denounced any interference from ‘outsiders’ in the French debate. For example, when Prime 
Minister Zapatero gave his speech in front of the Assemblee Nationale, the dissenters from the 
PS left the room complaining that their party colleague had given support to their political 
opponent President Chirac. Mr Chirac himself is said to have intervened in order to avoid a 
television interview with EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso on French television. 
And despite the numerous efforts by outside actors, the French debate so far remains firmly 
dominated by national politics. The problem of the foreign interventions is that they are not 
really coordinated. Many hope, however, that ratification in neighbouring Germany (with an 
overwhelmingly positive vote in the Bundestag on May 12) will send a strong signal to the 
French population. 
Ireland 
So far there has been only limited debate on the Constitution but interest has increased in recent 
weeks. The legislation to provide for a referendum will be passed before the summer break but 
no decision has yet been taken on a date. The government has published an explanatory guide to 
the Constitution and is preparing a White Paper. The National Forum on Europe has published a 
summary and a DVD presentation of the Constitution.  
The Oireachtas European Affairs Committee has held a series of discussions, the latest on 2 
March, involving experts on EU affairs and public opinion. These debates have largely focused 
on preparations for the referendum itself (including the establishment of the Referendum 
Commission), the state of public information and opinion and issues such as foreign and 
defence policy and immigration. 
The National Forum on Europe has started a series of debates – in Dublin and in cities and 
towns around the country – on aspects of the Constitution. The Institute of European Affairs has 
also published a detailed analysis of the Constitution and is preparing specific briefing booklets. 
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Debate in civil society has been limited but the influential Irish Business and Employers 
Confederation has clearly spoken in favour of ratification. The European Movement will 
spearhead a non-party political ‘yes’ campaign. 
Subjects with a positive impact on the debate include the fact that the Constitution was agreed 
under the Irish presidency of the Council, the clear statements of values and objectives, the 
incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the simplification of decision-making and 
legal instruments and the enhanced role of national parliaments.  
Subjects with a negative impact on the debate include concerns about sovereignty, doubts about 
the changes in voting arrangements in the Council, perceived threats to public services and the 
usual arguments related to Irish neutrality. 
The ‘yes’ campaign can be expected to have considerable political prominence with both the 
government parties (Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats) and the two main opposition 
parties (Fine Gael and Labour) campaigning for the Constitution. On the other hand, Sinn Fein 
and the small socialist party have clearly stated their opposition to the Treaty. The Green Party 
is conducting an internal referendum on the issue. 
Despite the large party political support, public enthusiasm for the Constitution in Ireland is 
low. Only 28% of the Irish people surveyed in the last Eurobarometer (2005) poll supported the 
Constitution while 5% indicated their opposition. This makes Ireland the fourth lowest country 
regarding approval rates in the EU and it also reflects its position with regard to knowledge of 
the Constitution. According to the same Eurobarometer survey, only 10% had heard about the 
Constitution and knew its contents and 46% had heard about it but felt they had little 
knowledge. This total of 56% is below the EU average of 67%. Thus the referendum campaign 
faces a major task of information and explanation but so far there is little serious media 
coverage and this is unlikely to change until the date of the referendum is known. 
Luxembourg 
There was some debate about the timing of the referendum, which Prime Minister Jean-Claude 
Juncker had originally wanted to have later (at a greater distance to the Luxembourg EU 
presidency), but which was eventually scheduled for 10 July in order to avoid a collision with 
local elections in October. The leaders of the main political parties (Mr Juncker of the Christian 
Social People’s Party and Jean Asselborn of the Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party) have 
staked their political futures on a positive outcome of the referendum. This move was seen by 
some as attempted blackmail of the voters and might have had a negative effect on the voting 
intentions. Recently, apart from opposition on the left fringe of the party system (Dei Lenk), the 
right-wing populist Action Committee for Democracy and Pension Rights (ADR) has come out 
against the Constitution, somewhat surprising even its own leadership, which had so far 
supported ratification. Neither of these groups, however, is expected to be able to prevent a solid 
majority in favour of the Constitution. 
The national parliament started an extensive series of public debates at the end of April around 
the country, which are broadcast on the parliamentary television channel. A first parliamentary 
vote has to take place before the referendum. The result of the latter then has to be confirmed by 
parliament in a second vote. 
This complicated procedure, together with the compulsory participation in the referendum, 
should further increase the share of the population who feel that they are reasonably well 
informed about the Constitutional Treaty, which in January (Eurobarometer, 2005) was already 
the highest in Luxembourg among all 25 member states (22% claiming that they know the 
overall contents of the Constitution). 
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Netherlands 
Until recently, there had been little debate on the EU Constitutional Treaty in the Netherlands. 
As in the case of Italy, the public attention was focused on the near-government crisis stirred by 
the resignation of Deputy Prime Minister Thom de Graaf.  
The limited discussion is also owing to the fact that media are finding it difficult to determine 
their approach to the document and how to frame the debate. As in the Scandinavian countries, 
some of the actors have focused their attention on the question of the appropriateness of the 
referendum instrument in the Dutch democracy. In this context it is important to note that the 
initiative of having the first referendum in Dutch history was not taken by the government but 
by the parliament and was actually opposed by the government’s senior party, the Christian 
Democrats (CDA).  
After this late start, the public debate gradually seems to be converging on the key question of 
whether the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty will entail a loss of sovereignty for the 
Netherlands or whether there are sufficient checks and balances in place to ensure that Dutch 
interests are appropriately protected. Opponents of the EU Constitutional Treaty claim that the 
latter is likely to give to the EU the status of a superstate and bring as evidence the very fact that 
it is equipping itself with a Constitution, the codification of the principle of the primacy of EU 
law, as well as the limited power of national parliaments to prevent breaches of the principle of 
subsidiarity. These arguments also appeal to general anxieties about the Netherlands steadily 
loosing power in an ever-expanding Union. Although the issue of Turkey is also often brought 
up by some politicians as an argument against the Treaty, the two issues have generally been 
kept apart in the public debate so far. Interestingly enough, the proposal for a Services 
Directive, which was presented by Dutchman Frits Bolkestein, is not playing any particular role 
in the debate.  
Most surveys now (mid-May) suggest a very close race between the ‘ja’ and the ‘nee’ sides, 
with the ‘nee’ side having been most successful in attracting people to their view in the first 
weeks of the campaign. Importantly, however, 20-30% of the electorate is still undecided. In 
general, an indication that emerges clearly from all of the surveys is that many Dutch citizens 
feel poorly informed about the EU Constitution, which in turn means that at least one-third of 
them are still undecided on how to vote. This large group acquires a particular importance in 
light of the fact that most of the observers expect a turnout even below the 39.9% of the 
population that was recorded in the European Parliament elections held in June 2004. 
The mainstream political parties (CDA, PvdA, VVD, D66, GroenLinks) are officially 
supporting the Constitutional Treaty, while the ones on the extreme left (Socialist Party) and the 
extreme right (the more traditional Christian Democratic parties and Post-Fortuyn parties: LPF, 
Lijst Wilders) of the political spectrum are opposed to it. The government has so far left the 
campaigning mostly to its Secretary of State for European Affairs, Atzo Nicolaï. A similar 
approach has been adopted by other parties, with political leaders leaving the floor to their EU 
specialist backbenchers rather than seize the opportunity themselves. 
Overall, it must be assumed that the campaign will only be decided in the final two weeks, if not 
the final days. Here the dynamics of the final campaigning days as well as the outcome of the 
referendum in France (three days earlier) are likely to have a major impact. 
Poland 
The debate in Poland has so far been mainly about the date for a possible referendum. While the 
pro-EU government parties were in favour of holding the referendum together with the next 
presidential and parliamentary elections in the autumn in order to obtain the 50% turnout, the 
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opposition parties wanted to have the referendum later. In this context, claims were made that 
the Polish text of the Constitution included major errors that had to be eliminated before any 
vote on the text could take place. Now, however, the timing issue seems more settled and 25 
September or 9 October are currently the most likely dates.  
Because of the uncertain political situation of the minority government, it is difficult to gauge 
political support for the Constitution. Poland therefore (together with the Czech Republic) 
marks an exception within the Union in the sense that a referendum that reaches the necessary 
50% turnout would actually increase the probability of getting the Constitution ratified: in a 
April poll by CBOS, 56% of respondents said they would vote in favour of the Constitution and 
15% were determined to vote ‘no’, with 29% being undecided. The problem, however, remains 
that in the same poll, only 34% of respondents said they would definitely participate in the 
referendum and 24% said they might – but it has to be born in mind that this data was collected 
before it was clear that presidential and parliamentary elections (expected to boost turnout) 
would be held on the same day. 
If the referendum does not reach the turnout threshold, and ratification will depend on a two-
thirds majority in parliament, the situation will be quite complex. A March 2005 CBOS survey 
shows that those parties strongly opposed to the Constitution (the League of Polish Families 
[LPR], the Law and Justice Party [PiS] and the Self-Defence Party [Samoobrona]) have 
significantly gained in support compared with their 2001 election results, and jointly 
represented 41% of expressed voter preferences in March 2005 as opposed to 27.6% in 2001. 
On the pro-Constitution side, the changes are equally dramatic: the centre-left coalition of SLD, 
Unia Pracy and SDPL (which achieved 41% of the vote in the 2001 elections) now stands at 
around 12%. Therefore, much depends on the stance taken by the centre-right parties, in 
particular the Citizens’ Platform (tipped to be the strongest party after the general election, with 
support of 22% according to CBOS in March 2005) and the Polish People’s Party (currently at 
8%). In any case, it is difficult to envisage how a two-thirds majority could be gathered in 
favour of the Constitution under these circumstances. 
Yet the debate about the Constitutional Treaty has only just started. With growing interest in the 
possibility of a French rejection of the Constitution in recent weeks, the debate has become 
more active. The main argument in favour of the Constitution is of course the overall benefit of 
EU membership, which is also credited for having swung public opinion in recent months 
towards more support for the EU as a whole. Similarly, future relations between the EU and 
Ukraine after the democratic revolution there are a factor in the Polish debate and could support 
ratification of the Constitution with its changes for a more decisive EU foreign policy. 
Interestingly, some elements of the French debate seem to produce mirror images in Poland: 
French resistance to a liberal regulation of the services sector (the Bolkestein directive) is seen 
as a chance for Polish citizens to avail themselves to their freedom of movement, rather than as 
a threat to some kind of European social model 
On the other hand, the anti-Constitutional argument based on the protection of national 
sovereignty and fear of domination by the largest member states has been fuelled by some 
elements of the French debate. The issue of voting weights under the qualified majority system, 
and the threat of ‘enhanced cooperation’ between a self-proclaimed avant-guard also continue 
to be used against the Constitution. 
Portugal 
Generally, both of the main parties and most opinion-formers speak out in favour of the 
European Constitutional Treaty, while only two small parties on the extreme left are 
campaigning against it. President Jorge Sampaio has also joined the debate supporting it. 
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Of the two main trade union confederations, one is in favour and the other (with a communist 
leaning) is against, following closely the arguments of the left ‘no’ campaign in France.  
Recently, the timing of the referendum has become hostage to a struggle between the 
government and the opposition about a different issue: the new socialist government proposed 
to hold a separate referendum on the controversial question of abortion as early as June. The 
conservative opposition wants to delay this plebiscite and threatened that it would block the 
constitutional change that is necessary to hold the referendum on the EU Constitution on the 
same day as local elections in October, if the abortion referendum goes ahead before the 
summer. 
This spat has somewhat accelerated an otherwise low-key debate, as has of course the prospect 
of a French ‘no’ vote. Nevertheless, a clear majority in favour of the Constitutional Treaty is 
expected, even though doubts remain over the likely voter turnout. Significantly, Commission 
President Barroso is expected to keep a low profile because of the electoral defeat of his party in 
the 2004 elections and his personal standing as head of the EU executive. 
Spain 
Debate was dominated by the fact that the two main parties (the governing socialists and 
opposition popular party) were in favour of the Treaty (representing 94.8% of the parliamentary 
vote), while several smaller left-wing and regional/nationalist parties were against it. 
Interestingly, most of the parties who were campaigning against the Constitution support the 
government in parliament, so the governing socialist party had to ensure that the issue of the 
Constitution did not break up the governing coalition. 
As for the substantive debate, it focused on the alleged anti-social bias of the Constitution (and 
the consequent split in the left in Spain, both in the political spectrum and in civil society), and 
on the ‘territorial’ issue concerning in particular the Basque, Catalan and Galician regional 
parties. Here the argument was mainly about whether the Constitution improves or diminishes 
the influence of regions in the European Union. 
A key concern during and even after the referendum is the low level of information among 
Spanish voters, which is seen to have contributed to the lowest turnout in any election in Spain 
since the restoration of democracy. According to an Opina poll of 2 February (18 days before 
the referendum), 64% of respondents had very low or low levels of knowledge of the EU 
Constitution and 23% had no knowledge at all. A post-referendum poll by CIS (February-March 
2005, Study No. 2595) showed that even then 67.1% had low or very low levels of knowledge, 
and the number of those with no knowledge had decreased only slightly to 18.9%.  
In this case, the referendum as such does not seem to have improved the level of information 
that dramatically, despite the efforts of distributing 5 million copies of the Treaty and bringing 
in celebrities to advertise it. Significantly, when asked for the reason they had a low level or no 
knowledge about the Constitution, the largest group of 40.8% respondents said they were not 
interested in the issue, while 31.2% said the government had not explained the Constitution 
sufficiently and 18.2% laid the same claim against the political parties. It is also interesting that 
according to many analysts, the referendum campaign did not produce a genuine debate about 
the merits of the Constitution, but rather led to a somewhat misleading and superficial 
discussion about Europe in general. 
United Kingdom 
In April 2004 Prime Minister Tony Blair called a referendum, giving in to massive pressure 
from the media and political opponents. The referendum is bound to take place in spring 2006, 
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after the UK’s EU presidency. Up to now public debate in the UK has been very much 
dominated by the national elections that took place on 5 May 2005. The campaign focused on 
national politics and the EU and European integration did not play any significant role. 
Allegedly, one of the strategic reasons why Mr Blair finally called a referendum was the 
possibility of keeping EU membership and the Constitution out of the election campaign, as 
these issues deeply divide the country. With the elections passed, the British debate can be 
expected to become one of the most controversial ones, owing to the profound split among the 
political parties and the public.  
The Liberal Democrats and the governing Labour Party are both in favour of the Constitution, 
although there will be some Labour dissenters. The Conservatives are strongly against it, but 
they have some pro-Constitution dissenters as well. Several parties that are not represented in 
the national parliament are also against it (the Green Party, the UK Independence Party and the 
British National Party). 
According to a Populus poll for The Times of 9 February, the ‘yes’ side took the lead for the 
first time (with 36% pro and 29% against the Constitution). Nevertheless, the Eurobarometer 
(2005) survey still found that the British are the most sceptical citizens with only 20% in favour 
of the European Constitution (EU-25: 49%) and 30% against (EU-25: 16%). At 50%, an 
exceptionally high number of persons had not yet made up their minds (EU-25: 35%). 
The (perceived) knowledge about the Constitution was also well below average: only 50% said 
that they have heard about the Constitution (EU-25: 67%), of which only 6% claim to know 
about its contents (EU-25: 11%). 
The tabloid newspapers and certain other media have already announced their (fierce) 
opposition to the Constitution, while the BBC has been criticised as being too pro-European. 
There are campaign groups for the ‘yes’ (e.g. Britain in Europe) as well as for the opposition 
(‘Vote NO’). Especially important is the fact that the business sector seems to be rather 
lukewarm on the Constitution (contrary to the Maastricht Treaty, which it very much endorsed), 
for fear of too much regulation and ‘red tape’ coming from the EU putting the competitiveness 
of British enterprises at risk. This gives a significant advantage to the ‘no’ camp in terms of 
financing. There is widespread concern that the social rights in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights would strengthen the position of the unions (the right to work and to strike) and 
ultimately force the UK to adopt stricter standards in the field of social policy. The debate is 
likely to become one about British membership in the EU in general, and the government tries 
to focus on this question arguing that if the UK voted ‘no’ it would have to leave the Union. 
Subjects that have a positive potential impact on public opinion concerning the Constitution 
seem to be rather limited in number. On the one hand there is an argument concerning the 
economic benefits of EU membership, claiming that if the UK were to vote ‘no’, one million 
jobs would be lost. Other arguments in favour concentrate on the broad themes of more 
democracy (e.g. through a better association of national parliaments in the EU decision-making 
process) and the enhanced efficiency of the EU (e.g. through the double-majority voting system, 
which is also more transparent than the complicated Nice rules). Likely arguments will be that 
the Constitution will introduce an ‘exit clause’, which makes it clear that membership is 
voluntary and that the Constitution confirms the principle of conferral in which it only gives the 
EU those competences that the member states unanimously confer upon it.  
Yet many issues are likely to have a negative effect on the debate, such as the question of 
national sovereignty. The EU superstate argument will definitely be put forward, referring to 
articles on the supremacy of EU law (although it is based on long-standing and uncontested 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice), on the legal personality of the EU and to 
provisions calling for good cooperation (denounced as a ‘loyalty clause’). Surely the ‘no’ 
14 | RESULTS OF AN EPIN SURVEY OF NATIONAL EXPERTS 
campaigners will also allude to a lack of democracy or accountability of the supposedly ‘corrupt 
gravy-train’. It will be claimed that the ‘Brussels bureaucracy’ lacks efficiency and it will be 
portrayed as a waste of tax payers’ money. Possibly justice and home affairs issues – especially 
immigration – will be used as an argument, ignoring the fact that the UK will keep all of its 
current opt-outs on this policy. It could also well be that the negotiations on the budgetary 
perspective will affect the campaign with a discussion on the UK rebate and agricultural 
spending (although the latter has already been settled).  
So far, there have been few cross-national references, but as the UK will be among the last 
countries to hold the referendum, the results in other countries will have some impact on the 
debate. The UK closely follows the evolution of the French debate in particular. The UK’s 
awkward situation would be significantly changed by a French ‘no’ and in that case Foreign 
Secretary Jack Straw has already put the British referendum into question. ‘Foreigners’ from 
other member states or even from the EU level will probably not be very present in the British 
campaign, as they would be immediately accused of tampering with a national debate. Out of 
concern about the emergence of these arguments coming from the ‘no’ camp, Mr Straw has 
already taken the precautionary step of refusing any assistance (funding or personnel) from the 
European Commission. 
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PART II: Countries to Ratify by Parliamentary Vote Only 
Austria 
Parliamentary ratification of the Constitution in the lower house (Nationalrat) took place on 10 
May 2005. It was agreed by a large majority of 182 MPs, meaning that all but one MP from 
both the government parties (the conservative People’s Party [ÖVP] and the far-right Freedom 
Party [FPÖ/BZÖ]) and from the opposition (the Social Democratic Party [SPÖ] and the Greens) 
supported it. Only Barbara Rosenkranz from the FPÖ voted against the Constitution. The 
Austrian Communist Party (not represented in parliament) is also against the text. 
The level of interest in the Constitutional Treaty has been low in Austria, because public debate 
has been heavily dominated by the break-up of the government party FPÖ. Large parts of the 
party establishment moved to the newly-funded BZÖ, provoking a risk of new elections. 
The main subject linked to the Constitution has been the question of whether a referendum 
should be held or not. The ruling conservative ÖVP, the SPÖ and the Greens would only be in 
favour of a referendum if it took place in all member states (preferably at the same time). The 
FPÖ has been the only party unconditionally supporting a referendum and on 9 May the former 
leader of the party and governor of Carinthia Jörg Haider (now BZÖ) announced that he would 
legally challenge the parliamentary vote and call for a referendum, because the European 
Constitution would fundamentally change the Austrian Constitution. 
As there has hardly been any public debate on the content of the European Constitution, 
important subjects are very hard to identify. The strengthened role of the EU in the world, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the exit clause are elements with a potentially positive 
influence on the Austrian debate. Nevertheless, with the broader public opinion being 
significantly more Eurosceptic than the political representatives, there are more issues with a 
potentially negative impact, such as the possible EU membership of Turkey, the economic 
contributions of Austria to the EU or questions related to justice and home affairs (asylum and 
border control) as well as a common defence policy. 
The Austrian public closely observed the German debate on holding a referendum. If Germany 
had decided to hold a referendum, this would have created strong pressure for Austrian 
politicians to follow suit. 
The Eurobarometer (2005) survey states that Austrian support for the European Constitution is 
below the average of the EU-25 with 44% in favour, 27% opposed and 31% who do not know. 
The claimed level of knowledge is, however, higher in Austria, with 72% stating that they have 
heard of the Constitution (EU-25 average: 67%). 
Belgium 
On 28 April 2005 the Belgian Senate voted on the European Constitution with 52 ‘yes’ votes, 9 
‘no’ votes and 1 abstention. The lower house of the parliament will probably still vote on the 
text before the end of May and then the parliaments of the three regions and the three language 
communities will consider the text. 
There has been hardly any debate on the content of the Constitution. As in Austria and 
Germany, discussion has mostly concentrated on the question of whether to hold a referendum. 
After an initiative for a consultative referendum by Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt and his 
Flemish Liberal Party (VLD), first the Conseil d’Etat gave a negative opinion on 29 November 
2004 on doing so without changing the Belgian Constitution. Then in January 2005 the 
parliamentary majority also moved its stance to being against a referendum when the Flemish 
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centre-left Spirit party changed its mind for fear that a referendum might be exploited by an 
anti-Turkey campaign by the far-right Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest Party). On 17 February 
2005 the constitutional committee of the federal parliament finally voted against the referendum 
initiative of the Flemish (VLD) and the francophone Liberals (MR) with all the other parties 
besides the Greens and the Vlaams Belang being against it. 
Another issue that is discussed in Belgium (albeit to a much lesser extent than in France) is the 
question of the social dimension of the Constitutional Treaty. Some trade unions have spoken 
out against ratification.  
Concerning cross-national references, neither the French debate nor any other one has had a 
particular influence on Belgium. On the political left there was some interest in the concerns of 
their French counterparts about the lack of social dimension of the European Constitution. To 
send a positive signal to neighbouring France, Belgium might ratify the Constitution in the 
federal parliament just before the French referendum. 
The fact that there is little debate seems to reflect a ‘silent approval’ towards the European 
Constitution by both the political parties and general public opinion, as both seem to be very 
much in favour. Except for the two extreme-right parties Vlaams Belang (supported by 11.6% in 
the last national elections) and the smaller National Front, all parties support the text. And 
according to the Eurobarometer (2005) survey, the Belgians are among the strongest supporters 
of the Constitution (topped only by the Italians), since 70% were in favour (EU average: 48%) 
while only 13% were opposed (EU average: 17%). The percentage of those who claimed to 
have heard about the Constitution (70%) was also slightly higher than the EU-25 average 
(67%), but the actual knowledge of its content proved to be only average. 
Cyprus  
There has been no significant or in-depth domestic public debate on the European Constitution 
but recent concern over the possibility of a French rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
risk this would entail to the Union’s future has pre-occupied the media and opinion-formers 
from mid-March onwards.  
Consequently, there has been a proliferation of public presentations and discussions of the 
Constitutional Treaty organised mainly by the government’s Press and Information Office, 
which launched a campaign of 28 presentations between 9 March and 9 May. Political parties 
and think-tanks have also organised public debates. Most have utilised key EU figures and 
experts (the EU ombudsman, Cypriot MEPs and constitutionalists). The debate in Greece is 
having an important impact mainly through media coverage, with key pro-EU speakers from 
Greece being invited to participate in events in Cyprus. All government-related websites have 
links to the Constitutional Treaty, while copies of the text and brochures have been widely 
circulated. Articles highlighting different aspects of the Treaty have also been appearing in the 
media. 
Among the subjects that seem to have a positive impact on the debate are mainly the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the solidarity clause in the event of an attack on a member state (Art. I-43) 
and the Constitution’s impact on the EU’s role in the world through its strengthening of the 
common foreign and security policy and the prospect of an EU foreign minister. As for negative 
elements in the discussion, concerns about inadequate protection of the European social model 
(i.e. the Constitution not being ‘social’ enough) echo those voiced in the French debate. 
On this basis, there seems to be wide overall support for the Constitution, even though 
knowledge about it is still patchy. According to the survey by Eurobarometer (2005), Cypriots 
were the least informed of all EU citizens with 65% answering that they had never heard about 
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the Constitution. Even though this situation has certainly improved with the recent increase in 
activities around the Constitutional Treaty, the level of debate is still low. Yet, since all the 
political parties support the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty as a positive step towards 
further political integration and efficiency (only the left-wing AKEL party has no clear position: 
its two MEPs voted against the Treaty in the European Parliament), ratification is safe. 
Estonia 
The debate in Estonia is rather low key, which is because none of the parliamentary parties has 
expressed any significant concerns about the Treaty. The accelerating debate in France (and in 
particular the possibility of a negative vote in the referendum) prompted the Estonian Foreign 
Minister Urmas Paet to state on 22 April 2005 that the Constitution will be debated and voted 
on by Estonia’s parliament regardless of how the French vote . 
This comes against the backdrop of a majority of Estonians supporting the Treaty but with a 
high percentage of people still undecided: the Eurobarometer (2005) survey showed that 32% of 
respondents in Estonia were in favour of the Constitutional Treaty, 11% were against it and 
more than 50% were at that time undecided. This also reflects the low level of information 
about the Constitution in Estonia. A poll by the Emor agency (14 March 2005), showed that 
while 36% of Estonians had not even heard of the Constitutional Treaty, only 4% considered 
themselves ‘informed’ of the contents of the Constitution, 21% had knowledge of it ‘to some 
degree’, and 37% had heard of it but did not know its content. 
Finland 
The debate on the EU Constitutional Treaty in Finland has been an opportunity to discuss 
Finland’s place within the EU’s political architecture, rather than focused on the actual content 
of the Treaty. This low-intensity debate also stems from the fact that by and large Finnish 
politicians are in favour of the EU Constitution. As in other northern member states, much of 
the attention has been on the ratification process, namely on whether to hold a referendum or 
not. Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen opted in the autumn of 2004 not to have a referendum, a 
decision that has been challenged by the so-called ‘referendum initiative’ on the 18th of 
February 2005. The 50 members of parliament who presented this legislative motion called for a 
referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty to be held in Finland in May 2006. As a 
consequence, the parliamentary ratification has had to be postponed until the referendum 
initiative has been dealt with in accordance with the normal legislative procedure. At present, 
however, it seems highly unlikely that the referendum initiative will succeed. 
With regard to the main elements that are affecting the debate, there is on the one hand the wish 
for Finland to remain a ‘good member state’. Overall, people are quite satisfied with EU 
membership. In addition, the current government enjoys quite broad support among the public.  
On the negative side, there are concerns about the way the Constitutional Treaty might influence 
the Finnish welfare state. Similar doubts are expressed concerning the impact of the Treaty on 
Finnish foreign, security and defence policy. In particular, this is brought up against the 
backdrop of a broader debate on the terms and conditions for the participation of Finnish troops 
in international peacekeeping missions.  
But there are also more technical issues that feature in the discussions, as for example the extent 
to which the Treaty will increase the openness and clarify the decision-making process of the 
EU, the question of whether it (and the Charter that it enshrines) will strengthen the rights of 
Finnish citizens, as well as the power of the European Parliament and the role of the chairman 
of the EU Council. 
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In recent weeks, the media have also shown increased attention towards the French referendum. 
On 9 May Prime Minister Vanhanen delivered a Europe Day speech in which he stressed the 
need to approve the Services Directive and conclude the negotiations on the financial 
perspectives. He also stated his hopes to see the Constitutional Treaty ratified, as this would 
bring the period of institutional development to a close. 
Concerning the referendum debate, the majority opposing a referendum includes the centre, the 
Social Democrats and the Swedish People’s Party (the three parties in government), and the 
opposing Conservative National Coalition. The parliamentary parties favouring a referendum 
are the Green League, the Left Alliance and the True Finns. 
An interesting finding of the Eurobarometer (2005) survey is that Finns have a fairly good 
knowledge of the Constitutional Treaty. Of the respondents, 29% had not heard of the 
Constitutional Treaty, 67% said that they had a little knowledge of it and 4% said that they had 
a good knowledge of it; these figures are above the EU average. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that the Finns tend to underestimate their actual knowledge of the Constitutional Treaty. 
Germany 
Parliamentary ratification took place in the German Bundestag on 12 May and is scheduled for 
27 May in the Bundesrat (just in time to send a strong signal for the French referendum on 29 
May). An overwhelming majority of 569 members of the Bundestag voted in favour of the 
Treaty, 23 against it and 2 abstained. Most of those who voted against it come from the 
conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) party, arguing that the EU Constitution would create 
a state in its own right and that the German parliament has no mandate to disempower itself in 
such a way. The CSU leader Edmund Stoiber announced his intention to vote ‘yes’ in the 
Bundesrat, but expressed understanding about why some of his party colleagues rejected the 
text. While the official position of all political groups was in favour of the Constitution (except 
for the far-left Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] with its two MPs), only the members of the 
Green party and the Liberal Democrats (FDP) unanimously voted ‘yes’. 
One MP from the CSU, Peter Gauweiler, had appealed to the German Constitutional Court to 
prevent the German parliament from ratifying the Treaty. The Court rejected his case, but in its 
explanations the Court underlined that Mr Gauweiler could appeal against the parliament’s act 
of approval of the European Constitution, once ratification has occurred. Mr Gauweiler has 
stated that he plans to do so immediately after the Bundesrat ratifies it on 27 May. German 
President Horst Köhler said that in this case he would not sign the ratification law, but wait for 
the Court’s ruling. With Eurosceptic judges like Udo Di Fabio and several others having already 
made public their concerns about the European Constitution, it is not unlikely that the Court will 
rule parliament’s act of approval unconstitutional.  
The German debate has so far been very focused on the criticism concerning the fact that no 
referendum will be held. The German federal Constitution (Grundgesetz) does not foresee a 
referendum; to change this, a two-thirds majority in both chambers would have been needed. 
The government proposed such a constitutional change, but the conservative opposition, which 
controls the majority in the second chamber of parliament (CDU/CSU) rejected it. The CSU 
was in favour of a referendum on the EU Constitution, but against a general constitutional 
change; most representatives of the CDU are generally against referenda. Nevertheless, a large 
majority of German citizens as well as media commentators would have been in favour of a 
referendum on the EU Constitution. 
After it became clear that no referendum would be held, public interest in the Constitution 
waned considerably, but lately the ratification in the Bundestag as well as the worrying situation 
in France has increased it. 
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Subjects that have a rather positive influence on public opinion concerning the Constitution are 
the strengthening of the EU on the international stage, a better division of competences and the 
enforcement of the subsidiarity principle, but also the general improvement of the EU’s 
efficiency and effectiveness (Handlungsfähigkeit) and democratic legitimacy. 
Issues that have a rather negative influence on the debate are the possible EU membership of 
Turkey, frustration about labour competition from the new member states as well as German 
companies shifting jobs to the neighbouring eastern states. There is also the feeling that 
Germany would pay too much into the EU’s coffers. 
While the German political elite are very much in favour of the Constitutional Treaty, general 
public opinion is less enthusiastic. According to two recent polls, however, many more Germans 
are in favour of the text than against: in the Forsa survey (April 2005) 47% stated that they were 
in favour and 20% were against it; the public television channel ARD (May 2005) found that 
59% were in favour and only 15% were against it. Yet considerable percentages claimed that 
they did not know or that they lacked information (in Forsa 33% and ARD 26%). In the Forsa 
poll, 81% claimed to feel poorly or not at all informed about the content and the aims of the 
Constitutional Treaty. The ARD poll in May showed that 62% of those surveyed had heard 
about the text. 
Concerning cross-national references, the German public debate on holding a referendum 
strongly refers to the fact that 10 other countries, and especially France and the UK, would 
allow their citizens a vote. As in France, there was also a debate in Germany about the Services 
Directive with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder supporting President Chirac’s position. 
Nevertheless, in Germany this issue has not become as directly linked to the Constitution as in 
France. Currently, there are many German politicians helping with the French ‘yes’ campaign, 
which has also fuelled the interest of the German media, as they have known faces to relate to. 
Greece 
Despite the recent efforts of the socialists, the Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the 
Communist Party (the main opposition parties, which were in favour of referenda rather than 
ratification through parliament) to stimulate the political debate, there has been little public 
attention given to the Constitution. This is also owing to the fact that both the governing New 
Democracy and the Socialist Opposition party (PASOK) are pro-European and support the 
European Constitution. 
The issues that dominated the discussion of the European Constitution ahead of the 
parliamentary vote were therefore mainly procedural and political debate focused on the 
unrelated but controversial ‘main shareholder’ bill put forward by the government, which has 
raised the issue of the supremacy of EU law over the national Constitution. In an attempt to 
promote greater visibility in public contracts, the government proposed a bill that bans big 
shareholders in media companies from owning shares in other companies that bid for public 
contracts. This seems to be incompatible with European law. Because of the sensitivity of the 
issue, the government has avoided stating very clearly the supremacy of EU law in cases of 
conflict. This debate was one important reason for the government’s insistence on parliamentary 
ratification. 
On the substance of the European Constitution, the Treaty was presented by the New 
Democracy party as an important step towards a more democratic EU, which promotes Greek 
interests through the mutual assistance clause and the inclusion of tourism in the EU policies of 
supporting action. The socialists, for their part, stress the importance of creating the position of 
an EU foreign minister and view the European Constitution as a tool through which the multi-
cultural and social dimensions of Europe can be furthered. Both of the smaller leftist parties are 
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against the Constitution, albeit for different reasons. The Coalition of Radical Left is supportive 
of European integration and in favour of the establishment of a Constitution. Yet it believes that 
the proposed Constitution would solidify a Union that in their view is economically too liberal, 
too protectionist against asylum-seekers and immigrants and too submissive vis-à-vis the US 
and NATO in foreign and defence policy. The Greek Communist Party (KKE) on the other hand 
is both against European integration and against the European Constitution, which it argues 
reflects the will of the right-wing European governments during the deliberations in the 
Convention and the IGC of 2003. 
In the end, the Constitution was ratified after only three parliamentary sessions, which took 
place within a week, and its importance was downplayed by both the government and the 
media. The increase of attention on the ‘no’ vote in France ahead of the French referendum has 
received more media attention than ratification of the text in Greece. 
Consequently, information levels about the Constitution are particularly low in Greece, with as 
many as 49% of Greeks claiming not to know anything about the Constitution. Also the level of 
support for the document was below the EU average according to the January Eurobarometer 
(2005) survey, which found that 39% of respondents in Greece supported the new Treaty 
whereas as many as 20% were opposed to it. 
Hungary 
There has been very little debate about the Constitution before or after the ratification. There has 
been some recognition of the fact that Hungary was the second country to ratify the Constitution 
in December 2004, thus confirming its European credentials. According to the Eurobarometer 
(2005) survey, knowledge about the Constitutional Treaty – with 34% who did not know about 
it, 54% who knew something and 13% who knew its overall contents – was very close to the EU 
average (in which 33% had never heard about it, 56% knew something and 11% felt well 
informed), yet support for the Constitutional Treaty (after ratification!) was significantly higher 
than the EU average: in Hungary, 60% of the respondents in January were in favour and 9% 
opposed (in the EU-25 the figures were 49% versus 16% respectively). 
Recently, the prospect of ratification difficulties in France has created some media interest, but 
no wider debate. 
Italy 
There was no public debate. The ratification of the Constitutional Treaty (which took place on 6 
April) was completely overshadowed by the results of the regional elections (held on 3 April), 
which brought the ruling coalition on the verge of a crisis and led to the resignation of Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who then went on to form another government.  
After this major upset, some more attention has been devoted by the media to the ratification 
process, prompted by analyses of the referendum debate in France. The latter has arguably 
received more coverage than ratification in Italy itself. 
The verbatim reports of the parliamentary meetings do show overall support for the text, 
considered as a historic step forward for the Union, tempered by some isolated, dissenting 
voices. None of this has had any coverage whatsoever in the media. Interestingly enough, a 
senator from the Northern League, the most (openly) Eurosceptic party, had been appointed as 
rapporteur for the bill. In his final statement, he stressed the particular importance that the vote 
had acquired, since the referendum that his party had called for was not going to be held. He 
also reminded the assembly of some of the observations formulated by the different committees 
that ought to be kept in mind at the moment of the vote. These were related in particular to:  
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• the concerns regarding a possible regression of the judicial protection afforded to citizens 
(with particular regard to social rights), which could be linked to the entry into force of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights; 
• the possible impact of the European public prosecutor on the general principles of the 
Italian legal system and especially on the structure of the judiciary; 
• the lack of a provision of a right to peace (similar to the one enshrined in the Italian 
Constitution); 
• the need to update the priorities of the European Central Bank, and to balance the objective 
of monetary stability with those of growth and employment; and 
• the need for closer involvement of the national parliaments in the decision-making process. 
According to the survey by Eurobarometer (2005), after the uncertainties of the last two years, 
Italy is back at the top of the table of the most pro-EU countries. Some 72% of the respondents 
declared that they are in favour of the Constitutional Treaty and only 10% of them declared that 
they are opposed to it. There have been no more recent polls tracking support, reflecting the 
absolute lack of interest in the topic. 
Latvia 
Debate in Latvia has so far been very low key. Most political parties are in favour and a large 
parliamentary majority can be expected. Recently, Latvian Foreign Minister Artis Pabriks 
voiced concerns in the context of a possible French ‘no’ vote against the Constitution, that fear 
of competition from the more dynamic new member states could lead old member states to 
reject the Treaty. Despite the broad party-political support for the Constitution, public support is 
below the EU average, with 16% opposing the Treaty and 41% supporting it (Eurobarometer, 
2005). Knowledge about the Constitution in Latvia on the other hand is in line with the EU 
average. Approximately 58% know about the Treaty, whereas 41% claim not to have heard of it. 
Only 3% feel they are informed about its key contents. 
Lithuania 
The Lithuanian parliament (Seimas) ratified the Treaty on 11 November 2004 with 84 ‘yes’ 
votes, only 4 ‘no’ votes and 3 abstentions. It thus made Lithuania the first member state to ratify 
the Constitutional Treaty. There was some public criticism about the rush having left very little 
time to debate the text publicly, but many members of parliament wanted to ratify the historic 
document before the newly elected parliament met for the first time on 15 November. 
Afterwards there was no significant public debate about the Constitution. 
The Eurobarometer (2005) poll states that 51% of Lithuanians are in favour and 11% opposed to 
the Constitutional Treaty, which is slightly above the EU average (49% pro and 16% against). 
Malta 
Since the present conservative, pro-EU government is in favour of the Constitution, and the 
main opposition Labour party has recently decided to support ratification in parliament, the 
procedure itself seems to be a formality.  
The main aspect that makes the Maltese debate interesting is the fact that the traditionally 
Eurosceptic Maltese Labour Party has taken some time to decide its position. Alfred Sant, 
Leader of the Malta Labour Party announced on 11 May that the Party’s parliamentary group 
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would vote in favour of ratification of the Treaty. The ratification of the Constitution will 
nevertheless be discussed further within the party and a general party conference has to vote on 
the matter in June. The internal debate on ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty within the 
Labour party had been triggered in March by the distribution of three reports to the press that 
covered the Treaty’s legal implications, political implications and the ratification process in 
other countries. Both the legal and the political reports agreed that the Treaty does not go 
against the Constitution of Malta, but the legal report made the reservation that this statement 
was only valid as long as the Maltese government did not decide to join the permanent 
structures of cooperation dealing with military capabilities and joint military efforts.  
Public debate has picked up recently following the internal debates in the Labour party, with 
two high-profile conferences on the EU Constitution, the first organised by the Catholic 
Church’s Commission for Europe together with the Maltese offices of the European 
Commission and Parliament. The conference focused on the lack of public debate and the role 
of religion in the Constitutional Treaty. The other seminar was organised by the University of 
Malta’s European Documentation and Research Centre, and it also discussed the possibilities of 
non-ratification of the Treaty.  
In this context, public support according to a survey by the Young European Federalists of 
Malta is much higher than the EU average, but is decreasing. In a poll published April 2005, the 
support was cited to have dropped from a high of 70% to 56%, which was interpreted as a sign 
of apathy rather than opposition. Knowledge about the Constitution in Malta was above the EU 
average in January, when 72% of respondents claimed to have heard of the Constitution, of 
which 12% said they knew its basic contents, while 28% did not know about the new Treaty 
(Eurobarometer, 2005). These figures are likely to have increased recently during the more 
active phase of debate. 
Slovakia 
On 11 May the Slovakian parliament approved the Constitutional Treaty with a great majority 
of 116 ‘yes’ votes against 27 ‘no’ votes and 4 abstentions. The government coalition partner 
KDH (Christian Democratic Movement) and the communists were especially among those who 
voted against it. Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda successfully won the support of the two most 
significant opposition leaders, Robert Fico and Vladimir Meciar, for ratifying the Constitution 
through parliament, rather than by referendum. The main political forces did not wish 
‘complications’ brought about by a possible referendum. Only the Eurosceptic-leaning Christian 
Democrats and a small opposition party Ludova unia (People’s Union) support the idea of a 
national referendum in order to gather public support against the Constitution.  
The bulk of the debate took place in the Slovakian parliament and its various committees before 
the vote on 11 May. Although there was little public debate, the parliamentary situation seems 
to adequately reflect the mood of the general population. Support for the Constitution in 
Slovakia is above the EU average of 48%: 61% of the respondents supported the Treaty 
according to the January Eurobarometer (2005) survey, whereas 11% were opposed to it. At 
67% of respondents, knowledge about the existence of the EU Constitution is also slightly 
above the EU average of 56%, but only 10% of Slovakian respondents felt that they knew the 
contents of the Constitution (EU average: 11%). 
Slovenia 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was ratified by the National Assembly of 
Slovenia on 1 February 2005, pursuant to Art. 3a of the Constitution and Art. 75 of the Law on 
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Foreign Affairs. Such an early ratification led to some complaints that the government had 
ratified the Treaty without giving the public a chance to get to know it. 
The Slovenian Constitution had been amended in 2003, pending accession, in order to enable 
the country to “transfer the exercise of part of its sovereign rights to international organizations, 
which are based on respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the 
principles of the rule of law and may enter into a defensive alliance with states, which are based 
on respect for these values”. In such instances, the amended Constitution also foresees the 
possibility of holding a referendum, without making the latter compulsory. The new government 
that was formed after the general election held in October 2005 had a much clearer preference 
for parliamentary ratification than its predecessor. This was partly owing to a fear of referendum 
fatigue, since Slovenia had held as many as five referenda in the last two years, and partly to the 
belief that the strong majority in favour of EU accession in the 2003 referendum represented a 
sufficient mandate for parliamentary ratification of the Constitutional Treaty.  
Accordingly, the Constitutional Treaty was approved by an overwhelming majority of 79 ‘yes’ 
votes versus 4 ‘no’ votes (and 7 abstentions). Six of the seven parliamentary parties voted in 
favour of the ratification, with the four ‘no’ votes coming from the ranks of the opposition 
National Party (SNS). 
The main concerns were not regarding the EU Constitutional Treaty per se, but rather the 
absolute lack of public debate in the run-up to its ratification. To appease these concerns, the 
government (in cooperation with some non-governmental organisations) launched an 
information campaign based on subject-specific publications, question and answer sessions both 
online and by telephone, public debates and other presentations.  
Almost all the parliamentary parties expressed their support for the ratification (except the small 
Slovenian National Party). This unity concerning the European matters is inherited from the 
previous period, when the national goal of joining the EU was the main concern of all political 
parties. 
Despite the strong public support, Slovenians have admitted they know little about the EU 
Constitution. According to Eurobarometer (2005), a total of 61% of the Slovenians polled said 
they had heard about the Constitution but knew little about it. This can be seen as the result of 
the very successful public awareness campaign led during the Convention process. People have 
heard about the Constitution but only 8% felt they broadly know the content and 31% admitted 
that they had never heard of the document.  
The news coming from France has had a negative impact on Slovenians. Many have begun to 
question the usefulness of investing public money in information campaigns when the whole 
ratification process could be brought to an abrupt end by a ‘no’ in France.  
Sweden 
The government proposal for the law ratifying the Constitutional Treaty should be submitted to 
parliament before the summer. The next formal step for the Swedish parliament is to write its 
report on the government bill and subsequently to vote on it by December 2005, probably using 
a qualified majority rule with a 75% threshold. The decision-making rule is dependent on the 
parliament’s verdict on whether the Constitution entails a further transfer of decision-making 
powers to the European Union. The odds are that this rather smooth process will run its course 
and that Sweden will ratify the Treaty ahead of the stipulated deadline in 2006, with a rather 
broad parliamentary support.  
There are currently some attempts within the ruling Social Democrats to force the party into 
holding an internal referendum (according to the party statutes 5% of the party’s members are 
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enough to call for such an exercise). Despite this, there has so far not been a heated political 
debate in Sweden, but more of a monologue from the actors who oppose the Constitution. As 
for the supporters of the Constitutional Treaty, their silence could be attributed to a number of 
factors, beginning with the fact that EU issues in general are not perceived as vote-winners. 
Consequently, these political actors prefer to play down the importance of the new Constitution, 
claiming that it amounts only to a codification and a streamlining of the existing legal 
framework.  
Currently, the ‘no’ camp is levelling most of its criticism at the chosen method of ratification 
(rather than the actual content of the Constitution): this is based on the assumption that, were 
there to be a referendum, the Constitutional Treaty would be rejected, while it has every chance 
of being ratified through the parliamentary vote (which is currently envisaged). 
The common denominator for those who oppose the Constitution can be said to be the loss of 
sovereignty and a reluctance to accept the notion of pooled sovereignty. Among the centre-left 
parties, the debate is primarily focused on the further centralisation of competencies at the 
European level that the Treaty would allegedly bring about. The question of the social 
dimension of Europe has recently entered the debate, but, contrary to the French case, there are 
virtually no actors advocating a further strengthening of the social provisions in the 
Constitutional Treaty. 
The developments in the domains of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and defence, 
as well as the codification of the principle of supremacy of EU law, are posing particular doubts 
for the left and the Greens. One argument that is being used by ‘yes’ campaigners is the 
increased efficiency of the EU in the fight against cross-border crime that would result from a 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty 
The Eurobarometer (2005) survey confirms that Sweden is among the most Eurosceptic 
countries in the Union: 27% of the respondents declared that they are in favour of the 
Constitutional Treaty, and almost as many (27%) of them declared that they are opposed to it. 
Conclusion 
Compared with the previous report, the present analysis by the EPIN network shows that the 
issue of the European Constitution is growing in relevance and visibility in many member 
states. The heated French debate and the importance of its outcome for the entire European 
Union have raised some media interest in almost all the other countries. Beyond this, however, 
there is a considerable difference between those member states holding a referendum and those 
choosing parliamentary ratification only. While national debate has remained very limited in all 
the countries that ratify by parliamentary vote, in the referendum countries national 
governments are forced to communicate the text to which they have put their name. 
Consequently, campaigns are getting underway now, especially where a referendum is still 
foreseen for this year.  
As far as substantive issues of the Constitution are concerned, there continue to be important 
differences in how individual aspects of the text are perceived in the various national debates. 
For example, the economic provisions in part III of the Constitution trigger particular concerns 
over a lack of social protection in France, whereas they have exactly the opposite effect in 
certain other countries, where they are portrayed mainly as ‘red tape’ for the economy, notably 
in the UK. This observation should also put into perspective the unrealistic hope that a rejection 
in France could lead to any substantive re-negotiation of the complex compromise package, as 
some on the French left for example suggest. 
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At the same time, the constitutional text continues to be benchmarked against maximalist 
national demands while the EU dimension is often ignored. The current French debate in 
particular often obscures the fact that the Constitution’s text reflects a synthesis of many 
national and political preferences.  
In all countries the influence of actors from the EU level continues to be quite limited, which 
further contributes to the perception of the Constitution as a national question. With the 
exception of the recent debates between members of the European Parliament and Czech 
Republic President Vaclav Klaus, the EU institutions are virtually invisible in the debates. For 
information and political leadership, national parties and their politicians certainly remain 
crucial, but a greater number of campaigners from other countries can help give the European 
importance of the text a ‘face’. In France we currently observe involvement of other EU 
nationals, but a number of ‘no’ campaigners are branding speakers from other member states or 
from the EU level as foreigners who are illegitimately meddling in their national debate. The 
same can be expected to happen in other referenda countries, for example in the UK, the Czech 
Republic and Poland.  
Yet, it is not only ‘no’ campaigners who hinder an EU debate. President Chirac, for example, 
did not help the EU cause when he tried to enhance his profile as the guardian of French 
national interest against the Services Directive (an initiative that he himself had once pushed 
for). After this classic case of scapegoating the EU, Mr Chirac then went on and intervened to 
prevent Commission President Barroso from appearing on a French television programme. 
Representatives of the ‘yes’ vote would therefore still be well advised to demonstrate the 
common European significance of the Constitution, because a national ‘us-versus-them’ 
strategy will harm not only the Constitution but also European integration as a whole. In the 
light of the French debate, this update report therefore concludes with a point we stressed in our 
initial overview in January: it will be very difficult to defend the Constitution against 
maximalist national benchmarks if citizens do not understand that this text is the product of a 
necessary compromise among 25 different EU member states (in the IGC), with civil society, 
the EU institutions, national parliaments and all the candidate countries involved in this process 
(in the Convention). Thus, 100% of national preferences are just not on offer.  
European integration also increasingly needs a common European debate, because the rest of 
the European Union is directly concerned if one country says ‘no’. If the Constitution cannot be 
ratified, we will be stuck with the Treaty of Nice. Maybe some elements from the Constitution 
could be saved, but coherence would be lost and an even more Byzantine structure would be the 
result. This is a scenario that would justify Euroscepticism much more than the Constitution 
ever did. 
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